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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that R&D productivity decreases with rm size. I provide an explanation to this fact by
developing a model of science production where heterogeneous researchers are endogenously allocated to dierent
rms. The main assumption is that rms invest in research to increase their absorptive capacity : the ability to
use and understand knowledge produced outside of the rm. Firms create absorptive capacity by building labs and
hiring researchers in a competitive market. Because of externalities, rms underinvest in labs. More interestingly,
researchers and labs are substitutes in the revenue function, even though they are complements in the research
production function. As a consequence, the greater the investment in research, the lower the productivity of the
researcher working for the rm. This generates a novel form of ineciency: for any given investment, the allocation
of researchers to rms is non optimal.
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It is typically assumed that rms invest in research in order to benet from knowledge produced internally.
Because of positive spillovers in the production of knowledge, this assumption implies that big rms should
be more productive than small rms in their research eort. The reason is that, since the total value of a
new piece of knowledge is greater than its market value, big rms gain more than small rms from any new
piece of knowledge produced. Big rms capture a greater share of total benet (private plus social benet)
of any innovation than small rms. As a consequence, big rms should always outbid small rms in order
to purchase any factor relevant in the production of knowledge. Big rms should hire the most productive
researchers, purchase the best equipment, and be located in the best spots, because these inputs are more
valuable to big rms than to small rms. Ultimately, big rms should be more productive than small rms
in their research eort.
However, a large empirical literature shows that the relationship between R&D productivity and rms'
size often goes in the opposite direction. Several authors (Scherer (1965), Acs and Audretsch (1987), Cohen
and Klepper (1996) who review the empirical evidence) document that larger rms are less productive than
small rms in their R&D eort by looking at number of patents produced in rms of dierent size. The
same type of evidence has been shown with respect to scientic research, which is particularly puzzling since
the production of science creates strong positive externalities. By collecting data on publicly traded rms,
Halperin and Chakrabarti (1987) nd that the number of papers produced per dollar of R&D spending is
negatively correlated with rms size and with total R&D spending. More directly, by surveying the same
workers over time Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010) show that productive R&D personel is more likely
to work for small rms than for big rms.
In this paper I focus on scientic knowledge and I build a model of science production where heterogeneous
researchers are hired by rms in order to work in their labs. The ability of each researcher determines the
productivity of the rm's lab. I abstract away from all other benets that scientic work generates for rms
and focus on the eect that science has on their absorptive capacity : the ability to use science produced
by other rms or by universities. Research provides a ticket of admission to an information network:
1
it
allows rms to be always up to date with the science produced by other rms and universities. Also, science
is dicult: only scientists that are actively engaged in research can read and understand several papers in
a timely fashion. In other words, using publicly available science can be costly to rms; this cost is lower
when rms produce more in-house research.
2
In the model, rms perform science not to produce new science but to increase their absorptive capacity.
It follows that the two inputs in the production of science - lab size and researcher's ability - can be
1
Rosenberg (1990), p.170
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Both absorptive capacity and positive spillovers have been shown to be relevant in other forms of knowledge as well (for
example technical knowledge). However, when it comes to knowledge dierent than science, assuming that absorptive capacity
is the only drive to knowledge production is an heroic assumption. Therefore, the results of the model are relevant to technology
production since they highlights a mechanism linking absorptive capacity with research productivity, but when interpreting the
results this way it should be kept in mind that a rather important mechanism is left out all together.
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complements or substitutes in two ways: from the technological point of view, depending on the cross partial
of the production function of science, or from the revenue point of view, depending on the cross partial of the
rm's revenue function. I will assume that the two inputs are complement from the technical point of view, so
that, in order to maximize the production of science, the labs and researchers should be matched according to
a Positive Assortative Matching Rule (PAM) assigning the biggest lab to the best researcher. However, the
decentralized allocation of researchers to labs will depend on the complementarity/substitutability from the
revenue point of view. I will argue that, because of absorptive capacity, the two inputs can be substitutes in
the revenue function and therefore the market allocation of researchers to labs may be a Negative Assortative
Matching (NAM) rule assigning the worst researcher the biggest lab.
To understand the intuition, let's make an extreme example and assume that rms produce science in
order to send their in-house researchers to conferences. To achieve this goal rms need to produce a given
number of papers per year; once they reach the required scientic output, doing additional research generates
little extra benet. It follows that rms can either invest in labs or hire a very productive researcher:
researchers and labs are substitutes in the revenue function. This implies that the competitive market
generates a misallocation of researchers to labs. In my stylized model, this takes the form of a Negative
Assortative Matching (NAM) rule: the worst researcher works with the biggest lab. Note how this example
relies on the assumption that, because of absorptive capacity, there is a strong form of decreasing returns
in science. This particular point is supported by Gittelman and Kogut (2003). The goal of their paper is
to establish whether valuable science leads to valuable patents. They nd that scientic knowledge and
patents are related, but good publications and good patents are not.
3
In other words, producing some
science deliver some benet, but producing a lot of science does not.
Therefore, if absorptive capacity is the main determinant of the investment in research, the model predicts
a negative correlation between size of the investment and scientic productivity. Also, if bigger rms have
lower cost of investing, there is a negative correlation between rms size and scientic productivity. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence showing that scientists are more likely than unproductive scientists
to be hired by small rms, as shown by Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2010).
4
However, the total science produced is maximized under a Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) rule
assigning the best researchers to the biggest labs. Therefore, in the allocation of researchers to labs, there
is a trade-o between producing science and using science. Since rms mostly aim at using science, for any
given distribution of labs the private sector minimizes the amount of science produced. As a consequence, the
decentralized allocation of researchers to labs is inecient. This ineciency is novel and arises in addition to
the usual underinvestment in public goods. I show that an appropriate set of taxes/subsidies to the amount
of science produced by each rm can solve the ineciency by inducing the rst-best investment and the
3
Gittelman and Kogut (2003), p. 380. The authors measure the quality of the scientic output by counting the number of
citations received by papers produced within a given rm. Similarly, they measure patent quality by adding all the citations
received by patents produced by the same rm.
4
The explanations oered in the literature rely on the assumption that small rms oer tighter performance-contingent
contracts than big rms, and therefore attract more productive agents. With respect to the job market for scientists, my paper
can be interpreted as an alternative explanation, having a very dierent implication with respect to market eciency.
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rst-best allocation of researcher to rms. I also show that subsidies to the investment in labs cannot restore
eciency since they do not aect the job-market for researchers.
In the second part of the paper I enrich the model by introducing universities. I assume that their mission
is to produce science and that academic scientists can work as consultants for the private sector. The job
of a consultant is to help a rm using the available stock of science. Scientists endogenously sort between
the university sector/consultancy and the private sector. Under these assumption, the best researchers are
hired by universities, and within universities researchers are allocated according to PAM: better researchers
get to work with bigger labs. These researchers consults for small rms, while large and productive rms
will hire scientists. Therefore, within the university sector the model predicts a positive correlation between
size of the investment and research productivity.
Finally, I extend the model by assuming that researchers care about reputation, which is built by produc-
ing science. I show that, if reputation concerns are strong enough, the equilibrium in the private sector may
switch from NAM to PAM. Intuitively, researchers are willing to receive lower wages in order to work in rms
with big labs. In addition, for a given lab, productive researchers are willing to forfeit a bigger portion of
their wages than unproductive researchers. In the new competitive equilibrium, productive researchers work
in big labs, but may be paid less than unproductive researchers because they receive a higher reputation
reward. Therefore reputation aects the production of science not by changing the researchers' incentives
(as in Dasgupta and David (1985)) but by aecting the job market for scientists. The prediction of the
model is that scientic sectors where reputation concerns are stronger are more likely to display a positive
correlation between size of the investment in scientic research and research productivity.
1.1 Related Literature.
It has long been observed that sometimes rms perform research to improve their ability to use outside
knowledge. This idea was rst brought forward by Tilton (1971), who analyzes the semiconductor industry
during the '50s and '60s. Tilton observes that, for these rms, investing in R&D was a form of insurance:
they were always guaranteed to be up to date with the latest scientic breakthrough. The term absorptive
capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who provide both the rst theoretical model of this
concept and its rst empirical test. Other important empirical works are Cockburn and Henderson (1998),
Gambardella (1992) and Grith, Redding, and Reenen (2004). On the theory side, several researchers
explored the strategic implications of absorptive capacity (see, for example, Hammerschmidt (2006), Kamien
and Zang (2000) and Leahy and Neary (2007)). In particular, Leahy and Neary (2007) derive some policy
implications by showing that research joint ventures may decrease the amount of research carried out by
rms. The reason is that rms invest in research partly to be able to use outside science. When the access to
science is made easier by the creation of a joint venture, there is no need to perform much research anymore.
The fact that the allocation of talented agents across sectors and occupations can have important aggre-
gate welfare consequences has already been discussed in several papers, the classic references being Baumol
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(1996) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991). In these works, by joining dierent sectors productive
agents are engaged in dierent activities. Ineciencies arise because the private benet from joining a spe-
cic sector diers from the social benet. As a consequence, for example, there may be too many bright
young graduates choosing to go to law school and not enough pursuing a career in engineering. In my model
instead, scientists are always doing research, according to the same production function, no matter the sector
they work in. However, it does matters whether a given researcher joins the for-prot research sector or the
university sector, because resources are organized dierently in dierent sectors.
The literature on knowledge spillover and geography of innovation (reviewed in Audretsch and Feldman
(2004)) shows that, because of local spillovers, the presence of very productive scientists has a positive
impact on the productivity of other scientists within the same rm. However, the eciency properties of the
the job market for researchers have not been discussed before, despite headline-grabbing stories about elite
scientists leaving one country for another country, or leaving one rm for another rm.
5
With this respect,
I show that the allocation of scientists across rms can be inecient. In some circumstances, there may be
an aggregate welfare gain (in addition to a local gain and a local loss) from reallocating scientists from one
sector to another, or from one rm to another.
Finally, the existing empirical investigations on the allocation of resources to researchers deal exclusively
with specic public institutions. For example, Arora, David, and Gambardella (1998) analyze the funding
allocation decisions of the Italian CNR (equivalent to the NSF) and show that the reputation (past publica-
tion record) is the main explanatory variable. I am not aware of any study looking at the determinants of
the allocation of resources to researchers working in the private sector.
In the next section, I describe the model. In the second section, I characterize the equilibrium for a given
distribution of labs. In the third section, I derive the distribution of labs, formally dene the equilibrium, and
prove its existence. In the fourth section I discuss the normative aspects of the model. I introduce universities
in the fth section, and reputation in the sixth section. In the last section I conclude by discussing possible
empirical tests, policy implications, and extensions.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of rms and a continuum of researchers. Firms dier in their
size s, continuously distributed over S = [0, s¯]. Researchers dier in their ability a, continuously distributed
over A = [0, a¯]. All agents have the same outside option assumed to be zero. The economy runs for three
periods.
5
For example Liu, M. (2009, November 14). Steal This Scientist. Newsweek ; or Climbing Mount Publishable: the old
scientic powers are starting to lose their grip. (2010, November 11). The Economist.
2 The Model 6
t = 3t = 2t = 1
Invest in labs Split surplusMatch and produce science
Generate surplus
Fig. 1: Timeline
2.1 Investing in Labs.
In period = 0 rms build labs. If a rm s sets up labs of size it bears a cost s, continuous, positive,
with continuous rst and second derivative, increasing in , decreasing in s, with
∂2c(s,L)
∂L2
≥ 0, ∂
2c(s,L)
∂L∂s
0
and s, 0 = 0∀s.
Therefore, it is cheaper for a big rm to set up a lab of given size. This can be justied in several way.
For example, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show that larger rms tend to have several research programs
in dierent scientic realms. The cost of setting up a new research program in a dierent scientic eld
(here, building a lab) is lower for bigger rms, since they can share some costs (for example, administrative
costs like procurements) with other research programs.
2.2 Producing Science.
In period = , each researcher is hired by one rm and works in the rm's lab. The amount of research
produced within each match is:
a, = a
where ≥ 0, ′ 0, and ′′ ≤ 0. Note that the two inputs are complements in the research
production function. This implies that, for given distribution of labs, the allocation of researchers to labs
that maximizes the production of science is Positive Assortative Matching (PAM): the most productive
researcher should work in the biggest lab.
The reader should interpret the lab size as everything that can increase the chance of a discovery for
given researcher's ability. This include physical machines (a bigger telescope, a more powerful microscope,
a state of the art DNA sequencing machine), as well as the number of technicians and post-docs. It can also
be interpreted as the size of a grant given to a researcher. The fact that some of these inputs do not require
an investment ex-ante but can be purchased after hiring the researcher will turn out to be irrelevant. In the
next section I will show that, in equilibrium, rms invest taken as given the researcher allocated to them.
This implies that the timing could be reversed with no eect on the equilibrium investment.
Finally, in real life, researchers work in team. This can be incorporated into the model by dening a as
the research team's average quality. A previous matching stage determines how researchers form research
teams, and how from a distribution of individual ability we can derive the distribution of a. In order to keep
the model as simple as possible, I will not pursue this interpretation further.
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2.3 The Private Benet of Research.
At the beginning of the last period ( = ) there is a stock of new science available in the economy. Call
its expected commercial value , and interpret it as the value of all the patents that can be produced out
of the available science. The private surplus generated by a match between a researcher and a rm during
period = depends on the amount of research carried out in house and the aggregate science . I assume
that the private surplus has an additive form:
 a, , s = s   a
where is continuous and dierentiable,
′ 0 and ′′ 0. The surplus produced is then split
between researcher and rm. Finally, is taken as given by rms and researchers but will be determined
endogenously.
Note two things. First, rms do not compete with each other on the product market. The reader
should imagine a scientic eld where many small rms produce patents out of the same scientic base. For
example, all rms may belong to the bio-tech sector, some of them developing DNA sequencing machines,
some developing drugs, others developing bacteria that can produce bio-fuel out of garbage. Some rms will
compete with each other, some will not compete, some other will complement each others. For this reason I
abstract from competition issues. Second, rm's size aects the benet of producing science: the benet of
a new patent are greater for bigger rms. It follows that size matters in two ways: directly and through the
investment .
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The interpretation of the above specication is that, because of absorptive capacity, rms perform in-
house research in order to decrease the cost of using the public stock of science. However, the function
could be everywhere negative, implying that science is always carried out for a direct benet. Therefore,
nothing in the mathematical formulation presented so far contains the absorptive capacity hypothesis. The
following two assumptions formally introduce it into the model:
Assumption 1. It is impossible to understand a new piece of science if no research is carried out in house:
lim = .
Remember that represents the new science that will be introduced tomorrow. Under the above as-
sumption, rms need to produce some in-house science today if they want to be active in the market and
exploit the new aggregate science . Note that this does not imply that the science produced in-house
should be enough to lead to any publication or scientic discovery, neither it implies that all the rms active
in the market invest in labs (it will depend on the specic functional form of ), but it does mean that
all the rms active in the market hire a researcher.
Assumption 2. The marginal benet of producing science is decreasing rapidly:
′′′ 0.
6
In general, the private surplus could be Φ(a, L, s) = η(s)V − g(af(L)) with η(s) strictly increasing. To save on notation, I
assume that η(s) = s.
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Assumption 2 captures the following consideration. Absorptive capacity implies that rms produce
science so that their in-house researchers can be part of the scientic community. Let's say that this is
achieved by attending conferences. It follows that a rm will want to produce enough science so that its
researcher can attend conferences, but producing even more science provides little extra value. Therefore,
the marginal benet a rm's enjoy from doing research is decreasing rapidly.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1 and 2, from the private sector's point of view the two inputs are
always substitutes:
 a, , s
a
0 for every a, R
The proof of proposition 3 is based on the fact that, when both assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the curvature
of the cost function is given by:
 
′′ a
′ a
∂2
∂ ∂L
∂
∂
∂
∂L
=
a
This curvature implies substitutability.
To have an intuitive grasp about the role played by assumptions 1 and 2, assume for a moment that
is an isoelastic function. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that is bounded below. This is quite natural if
there is no production motive and only represents the cost of using the public science. In this case, rms
invest in labs to reduce their cost. It follows that the benet a rm receives from carrying out research is
never above . This assumptions can also accommodate the case where there is a direct benet of producing
science, in the sense that can be negative, as long as this benet has an upper bound.
7
However, it may
be restrictive if the production motive is particularly strong.
In what follows, I will assume that absorptive capacity is the main reason why rms perform research
in the sense that assumptions 1 and 2 are satised. In subsection 3.1 I will discuss more in depth the
consequences of relaxing these two assumptions.
2.4 Endogenous Science.
The value of science is taken as given by rms but it is determined endogenously aggregating all the research
carried out in the economy. Call  the expected commercial value of a unit of research and the
of . The expected value of the stock of science is given by:
= 
∫
, s (1)
where the function , s R A, assigns rms to researchers, with the convention that , s =
represents an unmatched rm. The function is determined in equilibrium.
7
It is possible to show that boundedness implies local substitutability for large enough af(L). However to have global
substitutability one needs to assume 1 and 2: boundedness and assumption 1 or boundedness and assumption 2 are not enough.
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3 The Equilibrium for Given Investment in Labs and for Given Aggregate Science.
In this section, I derive the equilibrium arising in period  = , when rms have already invested in labs.
I analyze the problem taking as given the total amount of science produced in the economy , and the
investment made by each rm.
Let's introduce the following notation:
 s S R, the equilibrium investment in labs made by a rm s.
 s  s , s S A, the matching rule on the equilibrium path (for investment performed by
some rms) mapping rms to researchers.
 s, S  R R , the payo of a rm of size s and with lab .
 s  s, s S R, the payo of rms on the equilibrium path.
 a A R, the payo of a researcher with ability a.
I conjecture that the function s is strictly increasing. This conjecture will be proven in the next section.
Denition 4. For given , the job market for researchers is in equilibrium if:
 Feasibility: s s ≤  s , s , s ∀s.
 Stability: s s′ ≥  s′ , s , s ∀s, s′.
The existence of a unique equilibrium for given is a standard result in matching theory (see, for
example, Kamecke (1992)).
Proposition 5. Negative assortative matching (NAM) in the job market for researchers: the most productive
researchers work in the smallest labs and the least productive researchers work in the biggest labs. Similarly,
the most productive researchers work in the smallest rms and the least productive researchers work in the
biggest rm.
Proof. For given s, the two inputs and a are global substitutes. It follows that, for given s, the equilibrium
matching between a and is NAM. The result follow from the fact that s is increasing in s, since s enters
linearly in the private surplus function.
From the rms' point of view, researchers and labs are substitutes. Since the private sector allocates
researchers to labs so to maximize their marginal product, it follows that, in equilibrium, the most productive
researchers will work in the smallest labs. However, labs and researchers' ability are complements in the
research production function. The matching rule maximizing the total stock of science is PAM: the best
researcher should work in the biggest lab. Therefore, the private sector, for a given distribution of labs, is
minimizing the value of science . There is a trade-o between maximizing science and maximizing the use
of science. Since the private sector only considers the latter, the decentralized equilibrium is inecient.
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Proposition 6. For given distribution of labs, if  is high enough, the matching pattern emerging in the
private sector is inecient.
8
Proof. See appendix.
3.1 Discussion.
Proposition 6 shows that the competitive equilibrium allocation of researchers to labs is inecient so that, for
given distribution of labs, the production of science is inecient. This result is robust to several modication
of the baseline assumptions, although the model may become impossible to solve.
First of all, the fact that science enters additively in the private-surplus function is not relevant. Consider
a generic a, , s . If assumption 1 and assumption 2 hold (with the appropriate modications) then the two
inputs will remain substitutes. Assuming that the social-welfare function has some range of complementarity,
the private sector equilibrium allocation is, again, inecient.
Suppose now that assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. Proposition 6 shows that if over some range with
positive mass of researchers and labs the social-welfare function is supermodular while the private-surplus
function is submodular the private sector allocation is inecient. The reason is that, over that specic range,
the equilibrium matching will be NAM, but welfare can be improved by implementing PAM. Therefore, even
in situations where assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold, it is possible for the private sector matching pattern to
be inecient. However, if the function  a, , s is not globally submodular in a and , the exact allocation
of labs to researchers arising in the market can only be determined numerically.
It is also interesting to check what happen when the two inputs are global complements in the private-
surplus function, so that there is no ineciency in the matching stage. This happens when rms invest
in research because they seek to benet from the knowledge they produce, rather than to increase their
absorptive capacity, as in the case of scientic sectors that are very concentrated, or when looking at the
production of technical knowledge. Lemma 8 in the next section will show that rms underinvest in labs
because they do not fully appropriate the benet of new science. Therefore, if labs and researchers are global
complements, the model collapses back to a standard model of knowledge production where the only source
of ineciency is the rms' underinvesment.
4 The Ex-Ante Equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium I use is similar to the one in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001). The
dierences are that, here, only one of the two sides invests, and the rm's type aect the total surplus not
only through the investment, but also directly.
Denition 7. The quadruple , , , constitutes an equilibrium if:
8
The equilibrium concept used in this model is called F-core, and the type of externality is called widespread externality.
For a theoretical analysis of the ineciencies of an F-core economy with widespread externalities see Hammond, Kaneko, and
Wooders (1989) and Hammond (1995).
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1. The investment is optimal:
 s =
L
s,   s,
2. Ex post, the matching , , , is feasible and stable:
 Feasibility: s s ≤  s , s , s ∀s S. 9
 Stability: s s ′ ≥  s ′ , s , s ∀s, s′ S.
3. For any rm s, the payo from investing is
s, = max  a, , s   a
To understand the denition, assume that there is an equilibrium, and consider deviations made by a
single rm. Since we are in a large economy, any action this rm may take has no impact on the equilibrium
a . Therefore, whatever the investment, this rm can match with any researcher a provided that it pays
a .
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, for ≥ 0:
s,
=
 a, , s
(L)
Proof. From point 3 of the denition of equilibrium.
Lemma 8 implies that rms' investment solves:
s,
=
 a, , s
(L) (2)
In other words, rms maximize surplus taking and the researchers they will be matched with as given.
Since the social planner would take into account the impact of the individual investment on the total stock of
science, lemma 8 implies that the investment is inecient. Finally, note that the matching pattern expected
to emerge in the following period aects the investment decisions. It follows, for example, that any policy
attempting to change the allocation of researchers to labs will aect the investment and may turn out to be
counterproductive.
10
Also, any subsidy to the investment in labs may reduce the underinvestment, but it
is unable to aect the ineciency in the matching between labs and researchers. In the next section I will
show that the only way to reach the rst best in this economy is using a set of taxes and subsidies to the
amount of science produced by each rm.
9
The general denition of feasibility is more complicated (see Cole et al. (2001)). However, since the distribution of types
as well as all the functions involved are smooth and continuous, it is possible to use this simpler version.
10
Gall, Legros, and Newman (2009) analyze this problem in a dierent context.
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Lemma 9. In equilibrium the biggest rm hires the least productive researcher:
 ′ s 0
Proof. See appendix
Before showing the existence of an equilibrium, let's introduce a new piece of notation. Let's call a 
  a the lab a researcher of ability a receives in equilibrium.
Proposition 10. An equilibrium with zero research always exists. If the commercial value of research  is
high enough, there are also equilibria where a positive amount of science is produced. In these equilibria,
researchers belonging to the set [a, a] match with rms investing a , where:
a = max
 
R

=

, 0

(3)
a 
∫
a a a a =
a a a
  a
(4)
a =
∫ − ( )
− ( )
s, s
 s s (5)
a is the p.d.f. of a, and  s is the p.d.f of s.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the case of two positive investment equilibria, given by the intersection of a and
a , where a represents the aggregate science produced as a function of the measure of researchers
employed, and a represents the worst researcher employed in the economy for given aggregate science .
Of the two equilibria represented in gure 2, one can be considered stable (the high , low a one) and the
other unstable.
By focusing on the stable equilibrium, it is possible to make a few comparative static exercises. If the
value of a discovery  increases, a moves upward: more researchers are matched and more research is
produced. It is also possible to introduce an exogenous stock of science , science produced, for example,
by a foreign country. The graph should be modied by writing on the vertical axes instead of , and by
shifting a downward: home country is producing more research as well. Obviously, all the comparative
statics are reversed if we consider the unstable equilibrium.
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Fig. 2: Equilibrium a and .
5 The First Best
The social welfare generated within each match is:
S a, = sa   a
This function is neither globally supermodular nor globally submodular. It follows that the optimal allocation
of researchers to labs can only be derived numerically, and it may involve implementing PAM over some
range, and NAM over some other range. Intuitively, the social planner may, over some range, give priority
to the production of science, and over some other to the use of science.
However, we know that the social planner problem has a unique solution. This implies that the rst best
allocation can be easily implemented if transfers based on the amount of science produced by each rm are
feasible.
11
Proposition 11. The rst best is implementable announcing the following rule: every rm producing some
science receives a transfer equal to its size times the value of the science produced by that rm minus .
Since there is a mass 1 of rms, is the value of the average amount of science produced. Therefore, rms
producing more than the average receive a subsidy, while the others are taxed. However, even if scientic
output is observable, it is usually non contractible and, therefore, non taxable. For this reason, the rst-best
implementation has little practical interest.
11
See Hammond (1995).
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6 The University Research Sector
Given the technical diculties in dealing with the rst best, from now on I switch to a positive analysis.
I will introduce into the model new elements: universities, the government, and reputation concerns for
researchers. I will then describe how they interact with the private sector and the decentralized equilibrium,
and I will show that these policies and institutions play an important role in determining how resources are
allocated to researchers. To start, I will introduce into the model the sector that, in most countries, produces
the vast majority of new science: universities.
6.1 University researchers as consultants.
As before, let's start analyzing the problem taking the distribution of labs as given. Universities are made
up of labs. If a researcher a works in a university, he receives a lab of size  a . Researchers working in a
university in period = can then work as consultants in period = .
This assumption is motivated by the literature on star scientists. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998)
show that the birth of the biotechnology industry during the 1970s in a particular region can be explained
by the presence of star scientists: researchers with an outstanding research track in genetics. These scientists
worked in academia, and, at the same time, were active as consultants, were part of the board of companies,
and sometimes even created their own start-ups. Doing so, they brought into these private labs the public
science they contributed to create. For simplicity, I will refer to all these activities as consulting.
If an academic researcher works as consultant, the disutility the researcher has to incur in period
= is equal to a, a , so that the total surplus created by a match between a rm and a re-
searcher/consultant is:
 = s   a, a
Therefore, researchers (and rms) prefer the researcher to work in the university sector if a ≥ a : in
the university sector the researcher works in a lab bigger than the one she would work in if she had stayed
in the private sector. Because of NAM in the private sector, for any a , the most productive researchers
are willing to join the university sector. These researchers will then consult for the smallest rms (that,
anticipating this, will not invest), while big rms will invest in lab and hire their own researchers. Finally,
note that academic researchers are not payed to do research within universities. They receive their payo
by consulting for rms.
6.2 University Labs and Subsidies.
In order to derive the size of the university sector endogenously, I introduce into the model a government, and
I assume that its objective is to maximize the total stock of science under an exogenous resource constraint.
12
12
In the model, the government is uniquely characterized by its objective function. Readers may safely substitute the word
government with, for example, foundations.
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It is important to stress I'm performing a positive analysis and not a normative one. In most countries, the
government plays a crucial role in determining the amount of research carried out within the economy. My
goal is to introduce it into the model in the most reasonable way and to analyze the impact of its policies
on the overall production of science.
I assume that the government can employ its resources either to subsidize the production of labs, or to
build a university research sector (which can also be interpreted here as giving grants to scientists). Subsidies
are cheaper than nancing universities since they build on top of what rms are already investing. However,
subsidies have no impact on the matching phase. Instead, building universities, although more expensive,
allows the government to choose the optimal allocation of researcher to labs. Note that in the standard public
good model of science there is little dierence between direct provision of science or subsidies to private
research. Here these two policies achieve dierent goals at dierent costs: depending on the conditions, the
government will use one, the other or both.
The introduction of subsidies and universities changes the private sector equilibrium only marginally.
Before the investment phase begins, the government announces  a , the lab a given researcher will receive
if he joins the university sector. If a rm expects to be matched with a researcher that, by moving to the
university sector, would work in a lab bigger than the one the rm owns, this researcher should work in a
university lab and then act as a consultant. In the anticipation of this event such a rm does not invest at
all.
Finally, suppose that each rm receives from the government a transfer  , continuous and dieren-
tiable. The private surplus function is now  a, , s  . By lemma 8 in equilibrium ∂ ( ,L,s)
∂L
∂
∂L
= ∂c
∂L
.
In the same way, the constrained ecient investment equilibrium exists and the worst researcher matched is
given by  a, a ,   a  a   a = a . As far as  a = 0, nding the equilibrium and
a is analogous to the problem solved in the previous section.
The government problem can be formalized in the following way:
Lu( ), ( ( ))
 a a a a
(6)
s.t.
a = a , a (I)
=  a a a a (II)
a = ∂ ( ,L,s)
∂L (L)
∂
∂L
= ∂c
∂L
(III)
∂ ( )
∂
≤ 0 (IV)
a  a a a a = a a a a (V)
 ≥ 0 (VI)
where a are the labs in use in the economy, some of which are private a and some of which belong
to universities a . The rst constraint says that whenever researchers can choose between universities
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and private labs, they will work in the biggest lab. The second line is the government budget constraint.
The following three say that the investment in labs induced by the government by means of subsidies is an
equilibrium. The last line restricts  to be a subsidy rather than a tax.
It is possible to characterize the solution to the government problem.
Proposition 12. In the university research sector, better researchers work in bigger labs.
Proof. In building university labs, the only constraint that matters is constraint (II). Therefore, the govern-
ment will set:
′ a =

a′
a

′ a′
for all a and a′ working in the university sector.
Proposition 13. All rms receiving subsidies invest the same amount.
Proof. The allocation of labs in the university research sector is not achievable using subsidies because of
constraint (IV). Therefore if the government uses subsidies, constraint (IV) is binding:
a =
for all a receiving a positive subsidy.
Proposition 14. University labs are bigger than subsidized private labs.
Proof. If this were not the case, the government could save money by turning some university labs into
subsidized private labs. It also implies that the government will allocate the best researchers to the university
sector.
Figure 3 provides a careful illustration of the problem. In the top graph, the shaded area represents the
cost borne by the government. In the bottom graph, the shaded area represents the increase in due to
government intervention.
The government problem is too complicated to be solved analytically. Therefore, I resort to numerical
methods in order to determine when the government should subsidize, build universities or do both (the
details of the simulation are in the appendix). The results are reported in gures 4 and 5.
In gure 4 dierent quadrants report the optimal distribution of labs for dierent values of a and (
increases going from left to right, and a increases going from the top down). Figure 5 summarizes the results
of the same exercise for a wider range of a and . In both gures it is evident that, if the quality of the
best researcher increases, the government is more likely to build university labs. When a researcher is very
productive, the lab that he would work with in the private sector is very small: building universities allows
the government to allocate more resources on the most productive researchers. Finally, gure 5 shows that
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Fig. 3: Cost and Benet of Government Intervention.
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Fig. 4: Optimal Distribution of Labs (dotted line, no government; solid line, with government).
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when the government has more resources, it is more likely to use a mix of university labs and subsidies,
rather than only one of the two policies.
The government's policies increase the equilibrium  . Compared to the economy without a government,
now more entrepreneurs invest and more researchers are matched. This is represented in the bottom graph
of gure 3 by a decrease in a from a ′ (where ′ is the stock of knowledge before government intervention)
to a . Whether university research is a complement or a substitute to private research depends on the
number of new rms investing in research compared to the number of rms that stop investing because of
the creation of university labs. In gure 4, the researchers joining the university sector would work with
small labs in the private sector, so there is little decrease in private investment if the government increases its
expenditure. Simulations (not reported) carried out for several parameters values always found private and
university research to be complements. These ndings are consistent with the empirical literature. David,
Hall, and Toole (2000) review the existing econometric evidence trying to establish if university and private
research are substitutes or complements. They report that most of the papers looking at aggregate measures
nd a complementarity eect, while, at the single rm level, there is evidence of a substitution eect.
7 Reputation
Since the work of Merton (1957), it is well known that researchers care about reputation. Merton calls
it the race for priority : scientists want to be recognized as the rst to discover something. The role of
reputation in science has already been explored in the economic literature by Dasgupta and David (1985).
The general conclusion is that, on the one hand, reputation motivates researchers. This is very important
because an incentive scheme based exclusively on the quality of scientic output would be very hard to
implement. Second, it fosters openness. This guarantees the circulation of ideas and generates a faster pace
of scientic progress. Here I will show that reputation may have an additional eect. If researchers care
about science, they may be willing to accept a lower payment to work in a rm with a big lab. In equilibrium,
good researchers may outbid bad researchers for the right to work in a given rm, therefore changing the
matching pattern in the private sector.
Let's assume that the researchers' utility is:
a = a  a, a
where a is the net payment received working for the rm, and  is the reputation concern: the utility
derived from doing science. Researchers may care about science because their future earning depend on it
(through the reputation they build today), or simply because they like science. The following lemma shows
that if reputation concerns are strong enough the equilibrium allocation of researchers to rms will change.
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Lemma 15. Assume that an equilibrium with positive investment exists. If:
′ ≥ 0∀ (7)
′′ = ′′ ∀ (8)
the equilibrium is PAM between labs and researchers.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, researchers are willing to give up part of their payment in order to work in a rm with a bigger
lab. Because of the complementarity between labs and researchers, a productive researcher is always willing
to give up more than an unproductive researcher for the right to work in a rm with a given lab. Therefore,
the nal allocation of researchers to labs depends on the rst derivative of  : how fast the utility grows
with the amount of research produced. Note also that a similar conclusion will be true even if condition 8 is
not satised. In this case ′ should be greater than a very complicated expression involving both ′′
and ′′ (see the appendix for more details).
To conclude, I show that, for any  that satises lemma 15 there exists an equilibrium.
Proposition 16. Consider a  that satises lemma 15. An equilibrium with zero research always exists.
If the commercial value of research  is high enough, there are also equilibria where a positive amount of
science is produced.
Proof. See appendix.
It is possible to characterize the net payment schedule that should emerge in the market when reputation
concerns have the form described in lemma 15.
Lemma 17. Consider a  that satises lemma 15. If reputation concerns are strong enough, good re-
searchers will receive a lower net payment than unproductive researchers. In other words, if ′ a, is
large enough,
′ a 0.
If reputation concerns are strong, good researchers receive a high reputation reward  a, . Since,
when the allocation is PAM, the disutility is decreasing in ability, this implies that the equilibrium gross
payment (the wage) can be decreasing in a.
Therefore, the model is consistent with Stern (2004). In his paper Do Scientists Pay to be Scientists?
the author collects data on job oers received by a sample of biology Ph.D. job market candidates. He
nds that rms engaged in science oer wages 25% lower than rms that are not engaged in science. The
author interprets his results against the absorptive capacity hypothesis: rms giving a positive value to the
production of science should pay researchers that are involved in science more. The alternative explanation
is based on reputation concerns: rms do science as a way to reward scientists by letting them build their
reputation. Lemma 17 shows that the two explanations can coexist.
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Finally, it is possible to sketch what happen in a model with reputation concerns, universities, and sub-
sidies. Clearly, if reputation concerns satisfy lemma 15, there is no need for universities and the government
can spend all its resources in subsidies. However, if the lemma does not hold, the private sector allocation
will be NAM over some range and PAM over some other. Universities may still be necessary to make sure
the best researchers receive the biggest labs.
8 Conclusions
There are several reasons for rms to invest in research. The one proposed most often in the economic
literature is production: rms invest in research because they want to increase the stock of science. This
explanation imply that bigger rms should be more productive in their R&D eort than small rms. Big
rms gain more than small rms from any extra knowledge produced, therefore they should always be able
to hire the most productive researchers, have access to the most productive machines, locate themselves in
the best locations. However, there is empirical evidence that the productivity of R&D investment decreases
with rms' size.
A second explanation to why rms invest in research has been recently proposed. Using outside science is
costly to rms. This cost is lower if rms produce science. Therefore, rms invest in research to enhance their
absorptive capacity, which is the ability to use the publicly available stock of science. In this paper I show
that absorptive capacity can explain the negative correlation between rms' size and research productivity.
I build a model where rms build absorptive capacity in order to use outside science. I show that the
private sector allocation is inecient. In the model, there are researchers of dierent ability levels and rms
owning labs of dierent sizes. The private sector allocates researchers and rms according to NAM: the best
researcher works in the smallest lab. However, this matching pattern minimizes the total research produced
in the economy.
I modify the baseline model in two ways. First, I introduce universities. I show that the best researchers
work in university labs, and that, within the university sector, better researchers work with bigger labs in
order to maximize the total amount of research produced.
Finally, I explore the eect of reputation. If researchers care about doing research, the market allocation
of researchers to rms may change. In particular, I show that if the reputation concerns are strong enough,
the matching pattern emerging in the private sector is PAM: good researchers work in big labs.
The model can be tested empirically in several ways. For example, it should be possible to check whether
labs and researchers are substitutes in the private sector. Substitability implies that the increase in revenues
following an increase in expenditure in research facilities should be greater in rms with researchers that
are less productive. Alternatively, one could check the market allocation of researchers to rms. In this
case, however, the test should take into consideration the strength of the reputation concerns. Without
reputation, the model predicts NAM. If reputation concerns exist and have the features I derived, we should
observe PAM. For example, assuming that old researchers are less sensitive to reputation than young ones, the
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model predicts that productive young researchers should work in big labs and unproductive young researcher
should work in small labs, while productive old researchers should work in small labs and unproductive old
researchers should work in big labs.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
It is straightforward to check that substitutability at a given a, is equivalent to:
′′ a a
  ′ a
0
the proof of the proposition requires two steps:
1. Show that under assumption 2 
( )
  ( ) is increasing in .
Compute
′
′ =
′′
  ′
′′′
  ′
′′
′
that is increasing if
′′′ 0.
2. Show that under assumption 1, lim ≥
suppose not:  0 arbitrarily close to zero such that ′′     ′  . Take an arbitrary  0 and
dene:
 ,  a  ,

  
  

 ,
where a , and  , are such that:
 ,   a ,

   
  

 , = 
′
 ,   a ,
   = ′ 
since we assumed that
′′     ′  , it follows that:
′′ 
  ′ 

= a ,
    
because of the strict inequality, it is always possible to take a  , arbitrarily close to one, such that:
′′  a ,
     = ′′ , 
this implies that, in a neighbour of ,  , . Finally, note that = 0 is in a neighbour of 
and at the same time  , 0 is well dened for  . Therefore 0 is well dened and nite. This
is a contradiction.
Point 2 alone implies that the inputs are substitutes for small enough a . Point 1 and point 2 imply that
the two inputs are always substitutes.
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Proof of Proposition 6.
The social welfare generated within each match is equal to:
S a, = sa   a
one obvious dierence between the rst best allocation and the private sector allocation is in who is matched.
In the private sector, researchers and labs are matched if s ≥ a . Note that is determined
endogenously, and that there are multiple equilibria. However, the private sector condition for being matched
is, in general, dierent than the social optimal one.
Going back to the matching pattern, note that NAM is inecient only under some conditions on . To
see this, imagine that the economy is so unproductive (low ) that both from the social point of view and
from the private point of view, nobody should be matched. In this case any matching pattern will lead to
the same welfare (zero) so that NAM is trivially ecient.
It is easy to show that S 0 if:
s ′ ′′
Given this, we can be in one out of three possible situations. The rst one is illustrated in gure 6a. In this
case there is no complementarity in the relevant range of the social welfare function and NAM is ecient.
Imagine now to increase . The area of complementarity expands, and eventually we reach the situation
illustrated in gure 6b. In this case, it is possible for the social planner to reallocate some researchers and
some labs in order to have an area of PAM. However, this leaves some unmatched agents, that should be
re-matched somehow. Whether this deviation increases social welfare or not is left to be determined in future
works. If  is even higher, eventually the economy will reach the situation depicted in gure 6c. In this case
it is possible to rematch researchers between a and a with labs from and according to PAM and
increase the social welfare.
Proof of Lemma 9.
By point 1 in the denition of equilibrium and using lemma 8 we get:
′ s =
sL
 LL   LL
note that sL 0, LL 0, and
 LL =  
′′ a a ′ ′ a
−
a ′′
−
0
so that
′ s 0: biggest rms invest the most. By NAM between researchers and labs, this implies that
biggest rms hire the least productive researcher.
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(a) No Ineciency.
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
(b) Conjecture: inecient matching.

t t

(c) Inecient matching.
Fig. 6: Complementarity range and matching function.
A Appendix 29
Proof of Proposition 10.
For the rst part, note that if rms expect  = 0, they have no reason to invest in research. Therefore, the
total science produced will be zero.
Consider an equilibrium with positive investment. In general, if all the researchers and all the en-
trepreneurs in the economy were matched, the worst member of each group could enjoy a strictly positive
payo. In our case, since the worst researcher in the economy is a = 0 and  a, =   , on both sides
there is always someone that is not matched. Consider the match between the rm that invested the most
and the worst researcher. The researcher receive a payo equal to zero, while the rm receives
s =
∫ − ( )
− ( )
 s , s , s
 s s =
∫ − ( )
− ( )
s, s
 s s  a
where  s is the p.d.f. of s, and the second equality follows from lemma 8 and equation 2. In other words,
the payo received by the most productive rm depends on the productivity of the worst researcher matched.
The equilibrium a and are the solutions to:
a =

a  a, a ,   a = a
	
(9)
and:
= 
∫
a a a a (10)
The equilibrium with positive investment exists if there is a a, solution to equations 9 and 10.
Note that equation 10 has a nite value at a = 0, is equal to zero at a = a, and is strictly decreasing.
Finally, equation 9 can be rewritten as:
=
a a a
  a
(11)
Because of assumption 1, if a 0 the solution to 11 diverges to innity, has nite values for a , a], and
is continuous. Therefore, if  is high enough, equations 9 and 10 will cross.
Proof of Proposition 11.
The social welfare generated in each match is equal to:
S a, = sa   a
the private surplus is:
 a, = s   a
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clearly, a transfer like the one described transforms the private surplus into the social welfare function.
Finally, because of lemma 8, when rms invest they equate marginal cost to marginal benet. In this case,
it implies that rms' investment is ecient.
Details of the Simulation.
I choose the following functional forms:
  s, =
 a, = a = a 2
 a, =
( L) 2
and I assume that  a = 0: the rm matched with the worst researcher receives no subsidy. This can be
seen as a restriction on the amount of resources the government has. Note that all rms are identical.
The government problem can be written as:
u( ), , , 2
2
a 2 a
2
a a 2 a  
2
a a 2 a
(12)
s.t.
=

( )
 2
 
a ≤ a ≤ a 
2

a   ≥
2

 max
 
( )
 2
  , 0

a
2
  
a   a =
Figure 3 on page 17 represents it graphically. The objective function is the extra research produced thanks to
the policy in place (the shaded area in the lower axes) at a cost summarized by constraint (4) and represented
by the shaded area in the upper axis. Note that the increase in research at the bottom of the distribution of
labs (between a and a ′ ) can be safely ignored since it is an increasing function of the extra research
produced by the rest of the economy.
The simulation simply compares values of the objective function at dierent a and ¯. The aim is not to
determine the exact optimal policy, but to check whether there is an interior solution (both subsidies and
university labs) or one of the two corner solutions (only subsidies, only university labs).
I construct a grid 0, , a containing all possible values of a. For every value of a , I construct a
grid of possible value of
 
( ) 2
 2
  , ,

where is an appropriate large number. For every
a and I compute a using constraint (4) of 12. I consider the pair a and admissible if a =
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
Fig. 7: Utility Possibility Frontier.
 
2

a   ≥ . Finally, I compute the value of the objective function. The nal solution is the
admissible pair

a ,
	
returning the highest value.
Finally, in the standard simulation, the value for is 0 0 and for  is 00. When checking for the
complementarity or substitability of private and university research, the parameters I tried are: a [0, ],
[0, ], 0 0 , 0 , and  , 00, 0 ; technical reasons restricted the choice of ; the other
parameters were picked arbitrarily.
Proof of Lemma 15.
Figure 7 represents the utility possibility frontier of a match. For a given distribution of labs, whenever
the equilibrium payos lie on the 45 degrees part, under lemma 15 the equilibrium matching is PAM. The
reason is that the total surplus function  a, , s  a, (transferable between researchers and rms)
is supermodular: rms with bigger labs are better o by matching with more productive researchers, and
vice versa.
However, since the wage cannot be negative, the utility possibility frontier has a kink. At the kink,
researchers receive  a, and rms receive  a, , s . Again, for given s, the payo of each side is
increasing in the other side's type. This implies that the equilibrium is PAM for these agents as well.
Finally, note that both sides prefer to be matched with a high type than with a low type, even when it
means switching from the kink region to the the 45 degree region. This implies that the equilibrium is PAM
overall.
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Proof of Proposition 16.
Since lemma 15 imposes restrictions only on the slope of  I can normalize  a, a = 0. This implies
that, as before, the worst researcher matched is given by:
 a, a , s = a a
and the value of the total stock of science in the economy is given by:
= 
∫
a a a a
This problem is identical to the one solved in the proof of proposition 10.
Proof of Lemma 17.
By stability, whenever a 0:
 a, s , s  a, s   s ≥  a, s′ , s′  a, s′   s′
Write the same condition for a′, and take limits for a′ a:
′ s = L
′ s  s 
′
L
′ s
note that
′ s 0 since we are considering only the transferable-utility part of the utility possibility fronteer.
By feasibility:
 s , s , s = s s
Dierentiate both sides with respect to s. By simple algebra:
′ a =  ′ a  L [
′ s ]  [ s      
′]
that is negative if ′ is big enough.
